An early death is, undoubtedly, a serious disadvantage. However, the compensation of short-lived individuals has remained so far largely unexplored, probably because it appears infeasible. Indeed, short-lived agents can hardly be identi…ed ex ante, and cannot be compensated ex post. We argue that, despite those di¢ culties, a compensation can be carried out by encouraging early consumption in the life cycle. In a model with heterogeneous preferences and longevities, we show how a speci…c social criterion can be derived from intuitive principles, and we study the corresponding optimal policy under various informational assumptions. We also examine the robustness of our solution to alternative types of preferences and savings policies.
Introduction
It is undeniably true that an early death constitutes a serious loss, even when it is due to natural causes. Such a loss should, in a fair society, imply a compensation. However, the compensation of short-lived persons has remained so far largely unexplored in policy circles. The absence of debate on that issue is surprising, since longevity inequalities are widely documented. It is well-known that sizeable longevity di¤erentials exist even within a given cohort, as shown by Figure 1 .
1 Although all cohort members are, by de…nition, born in the same country and at the same epoch, there is a substantial dispersion of the age at death, some persons turning out to have longer lives than others. Given that longevity di¤erentials are mainly explained by factors on which individuals have, on their own, little control, there exists a strong ethical intuition for compensating short-lived agents, who are, in some sense, victims of the arbitrariness of Nature.
2 Longevity inequalities due to di¤erences in genetic backgrounds are the best illustration of this. According to Christensen et al (2006) , about one quarter to one third of longevity inequalities within a cohort can be explained by di¤erences in 1 Sources: the Human Mortality Data Base (2009). 2 Note that longevity is also in ‡uenced by individuals, for instance through their lifestyles (see Kaplan et al 1987) , but those behavioural determinants of longevity (e.g. smoking, diet, physical activity, etc.) only explain one part of longevity di¤erentials, the rest remaining out of individuals' control (e.g. genetic background, environmental determinants of longevity, etc.). the genetic background. Hence there is a strong intuitive support for compensating the short-lived, who cannot be regarded as responsible for their genes.
But despite the sizeable -and largely arbitrary -longevity di¤erentials, little attention has been paid to the compensation of short-lived agents. The reason behind that neglect lies in the apparent impossibility to compensate short-lived individuals. A …rst di¢ culty is that short-lived agents can hardly be identi…ed ex ante. Life-tables statistics show the distribution of the age at death in a population or a subpopulation (e.g., by gender), but do not tell us what the longevity of each individual will be. Another di¢ culty is that, ex post, i.e., once a short-lived person is identi…ed, its wellbeing can no longer be a¤ected, so that little compensation can take place at that stage. Thus we face a non-trivial compensation problem: agents to be compensated cannot be identi…ed ex ante, and cannot be compensated ex post. Such di¢ culties may explain why little attention has been paid to the compensation of an early death.
The goal of the present paper is to propose a way to overcome those di¢ culties. For that purpose, the …rst part of this paper is devoted to the construction of a measure of social welfare in the context of unequal longevities. The social objective is derived from basic principles guaranteeing that compensating the agents who turn out to be short-lived would be desirable. Moreover, the approach, of the "egalitarian-equivalent" type, takes agents'preferences over longevity into account. 3 More precisely, the proposed social objective evaluates a particular social state by looking at the smallest consumption the individuals would accept in the replacement of their current situation, if they could bene…t from some reference longevity level. In sum, it applies the maximin criterion to what we call the Constant Consumption Pro…le Equivalent on the Reference Lifetime (CCPERL). Hence we shall refer to the social objective we propose as the Maximin CCPERL.
Once the social objective is de…ned, it can be used to compute the optimal allocation of resources in various environments. In the second part of the paper, we compute the social optimum in a context in which the social planner knows each individual's preferences and life expectancy, as well as the statistical distribution of longevities in the population (but not individual longevities). We then also consider the more relevant second-best context, in which the planner knows the distribution of all variables (including longevity), but ignores each individual's preferences and life expectancy. It might seem that very little compensation for a short life can be made in this case, but the planner can nonetheless improve the lot of the short-lived agents by inducing everyone to consume more in the …rst part of their life, and less in the second part, than they spontaneously would. One of the key results of this 3 The egalitarian-equivalent approach to equity was …rst introduced by Pazner and Schmeidler (1978). paper is that it is even possible, in general cases, to eliminate welfare inequalities between short-lived and long-lived agents. Admittedly, the corresponding policy may look counterintuitive and is certainly not common. In the conclusion we discuss the prospects of application of this approach.
Finally, it should be stressed here that the policy recommendations implied by the Maximin CCPERL social objective, although uncommon, are nonetheless far less counterintuitive than the redistributive implications of utilitarianism in the context of unequal longevities. Actually, as shown by Bommier et al (2009 Bommier et al ( , 2010 and Leroux et al (2011) , utilitarianism tends, under standard assumptions like time-additive lifetime welfare and expected utility hypothesis, to redistribute resources from shortlived agents towards long-lived agents, against any intuition of compensation. 4 Our approach is, in this light, more intuitive and attractive than utilitarianism.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the framework. Section 3 derives a social objective from ethical axioms. Section 4 characterizes the optimal allocation of resources under Maximin CCPERL in an economy with heterogeneous preferences and life expectancies, under perfect information of agents' ex ante characteristics (…rst-best problem) and asymmetric information of those characteristics (second-best problem). Section 5 explores some generalizations and evaluates the robustness of the Maximin CCPERL solution to various assumptions, such as the reference longevity level and the savings policies. Section 6 concludes.
The framework
The model describes the situation of a given …nite population of agents with ordinal preferences over lifetime consumption pro…les. We consider a pure exchange economy, because the central tenets of the compensation problem can be captured in absence of production.
The set of natural integers (resp., real numbers) is denoted N (resp., R). Let N be the set of individuals, with cardinality jN j. The maximum possible lifespan for any individual, i.e., the maximum number of periods that can ever be lived, is denoted by T , with T 2 N and T > 1.
Each individual will have a particular lifetime consumption pro…le. Under the assumption of non-negative consumptions, a lifetime consumption pro…le for an individual i 2 N is a vector of dimension T or less, that is, it is an element x i in the set X = S T =1 R`+. The longevity of an individual i with consumption pro…le x i is de…ned by a function : X ! N, such that (x i ) is the dimension of the lifetime consumption pro…le, that is, the length of existence of individual i.
An allocation de…nes a consumption pro…le for each individual in the population N . Formally, an allocation for N is a vector x N := (x i ) i2N 2 X jN j : Each individual i 2 N has well-de…ned preferences over the set of lifetime consumption pro…les X. 5 His preferences are described by an ordering R i (i.e. a re ‡exive, transitive and complete binary relation). For all x i 2 X, the indi¤erence set at x i for R i is de…ned as I(x i ; R i ) := fy i 2 X j y i I i x i g. For any lives x i and y i of equal length, preferences over x i and y i are assumed to be continuous, convex and weakly monotonic (i.e. x i y i implies x i R i y i and x i y i implies x i P i y i ). 6 Moreover, we assume that for all x i 2 X; there exists (c; :::; c) 2 R T + such that x i I i (c; :::; c) ; which means that no lifetime consumption pro…le is worse or better than all lifetime consumption pro…les with full longevity. This excludes lexicographic preferences for which longevity is an absolute good or bad. Let < be the set of all preference orderings on X satisfying these properties. A preference pro…le for N is a list of preference orderings of the members of N , denoted R N := (R i ) i2N 2 < jN j . Figure 2 shows an example of agents'preferences in a two-period setting, i.e. for
+ . An agent who lives the …rst period only remains on the horizontal axis (i.e. second period consumption is zero). The dashed line segments mean that the individual is indi¤erent between the two extreme points of the line segment. The upper end of the dashed segment gives the (constant) consumption that should be given to the agent in each period of a hypothetical two-period life to make him exactly as well-o¤ as he is with a single period of life. Figure 2 illustrates that, to keep the same satisfaction level while raising the length of life, what is required may possibly be either a smaller or a larger consumption per period, depending on the consumption enjoyed while having a short life. For a short-lived individual whose consumption is high (i.e. at the right of the horizontal axis), the consumption that should be given to him in a two-period life to make him indi¤erent with its current state, which is given by the end of the dashed segment, would be much smaller than its current consumption. This re ‡ects the attractiveness of a longer life for a person with a high current standard of living. On the contrary, for a short-lived agent whose consumption is low (i.e. at the left of the horizontal axis), the consumption that should be given to him in a two-period life to make him indi¤erent with its current state might be larger than his current consumption. His low current consumption puts him in such a misery that the lengthening of his life with the same consumption per period would make him worse o¤. Hence additional consumption per period is needed to compensate him for having a longer life.
Clearly, all allocations are not equivalent in terms of how short-lived agents are treated. Therefore, in order to provide theoretical foundations to the compensation of short-lived persons, it is necessary to de…ne social preferences over allocations. Such social preferences will serve to compare allocations in terms of their goodness and fairness. Those social preferences will be formalized by a social ordering function % which associates every admissible preference pro…le R N of the population with an ordering % R N de…ned on the set of all possible allocations for N , that is, an ordering de…ned on X jN j . For all x N ; y N 2 X jN j , x N % R N y N means that the allocation x N is, under the preference pro…le R N , at least as good as the allocation y N . The symbols R N and R N will denote strict preference and indi¤erence, respectively.
The social objective
This section aims at deriving a social objective that is adequate for the allocation of resources among agents having unequal longevities. As mentioned above, standard social objectives like utilitarianism do not do justice to basic intuitions supporting the compensation of the short-lived, so that we need to look for other objectives. Obviously, there exist many possible social preferences. The only way to select reasonable social preferences is to impose some plausible ethical requirements that these should satisfy. Such ethical requirements will take here the form of four axioms.
The …rst axiom states that if all individuals prefer one allocation to another, then this should also be regarded as socially preferable to that alternative.
Axiom 1 (Weak Pareto) For all preference pro…les R N 2 < jN j , all allocations
That axiom can be justi…ed on two grounds. First, it seems essential to respect individual preferences in order to address trade-o¤s between, for instance, consumption at di¤erent points in life. Second, the Pareto axiom is also a guarantee against the choice of ine¢ cient allocations: it states that any unanimity in the population regarding the ranking of two allocations should be respected by social preferences.
The next axiom requires social preferences to use the relevant kind of information about individual preferences. More precisely, it states that, in order to compare allocations, it is su¢ cient to look at the indi¤erence sets of the individuals at the consumption pro…les under consideration. This condition, which was …rst introduced by Hansson (1973) and Pazner (1979) , requires that social preferences over two allocations depend only on the individual indi¤erence curves at these allocations. Note, however, that those indi¤erence curves contain more information than individual pairwise preferences over these two allocations. This allows us to avoid Arrow's impossibility result.
The next two axioms are re…nements of the Pigou-Dalton principle in the context of unequal longevities.
The Pigou-Dalton principle for Equal Preferences and Equal Lifetimes is an immediate translation of the Pigou-Dalton principle in the present context. It states that, if we take two allocations such that the consumption pro…les are exactly the same under the two allocations for everyone except for two persons, then, if those two individuals have equal lifetimes and equal preferences, the allocation in which the two agents have, when alive, closer consumption pro…les is more socially desirable than the one in which they have more unequal consumption pro…les.
Axiom 3 (Pigou-Dalton for Equal Preferences and Equal Lifetimes) For all R N 2 < jN j , all x N , y N 2 X jN j , and all i, j 2 N , if R i = R j and if (x i ) = (y i ) = (x j ) = (y j ) =`, and if there exists 2 R`+ + such that
That axiom is pretty intuitive: for agents who are identical in terms of everything (i.e. longevities, preferences) except their consumptions, a redistribution (without any loss) from the agent with the higher consumption to the agent with the lower consumption constitutes a social improvement.
While that re…ned version of the Pigou-Dalton principle is intuitive, it is nonetheless restricted to agents with equal preferences, which is a strong restriction. Actually, we would like also to be able to say whether a consumption transfer is a social improvement or not when agents have di¤erent preferences. Note, however, that making this kind of statement is not trivial, as it is not obvious to see in which case some consumption transfer from a rich to a poor could be regarded as a social improvement whatever individual preferences are.
In the following axiom, it is argued that, if the two agents in question have a longevity that is equal to a level of reference` , then a transfer that lowers the constant consumption pro…le of the rich and raises the constant consumption pro…le of the poor constitutes a social improvement, whatever individual preferences are.
Axiom 4 (Pigou-Dalton for Constant Consumption and Reference Lifetime) For all R N 2 < jN j , all x N , y N 2 X jN j , and all i, j 2 N , such that (x i ) = (y i ) = (x j ) = (y j ) =` , and x i and x j are constant consumption pro…les, if there exists 2 R` ++ such that y i x i = y i x j = y j + y j and x k = y k for all k 6 = i; j, then
The reference longevity level` can be interpreted in the following way. An external observer could, when comparing the lives of two persons with the same length , say who is better o¤ than the other by just looking at the constant consumption pro…les of those agents, without knowing anything about their preferences. Thus,` is the length of life such that if it is enjoyed by distinct persons, one can compare the well-being of those agents directly from their consumptions (provided they are constant over time), without caring for their preferences. Note that this axiom is weak. It would be tempting to extend it to cases in which the longevity of the agents can take other values than a particular` : isn't it intuitive that a greater constant consumption for any given longevity makes one better o¤? Unfortunately, such an extension would render the axiom incompatible with Weak Pareto.
7 This is why the axiom can be formulated for at most one reference level of longevity.
There is no need, at this stage, to assign a speci…c level to the reference longevitỳ . Intuitively, it makes sense to set` at the "normal" lifespan, that is, the lifespan that everyone -whatever one's life-plans are -would like to have, but it is not trivial to see which lifespan is the normal one. Note that the selection of` may have important redistributive consequences, in combination with the Pareto axiom. Taking, for instance, a maximal lifespan of 120 years as the reference would imply giving priority to those who have a strong preference for longevity. This is because their situation is equivalent, according to their own preferences, to a situation in which they live for 120 years with a low consumption. Given that the "normal" lifespan may vary with the circumstances -in particular with the quality of life (health status) -, we will not …x it, and keep it as an ethical parameter.
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The four ethical principles that are presented above seem quite reasonable. We now have to investigate which kind of social preferences do satisfy these conditions. As we shall see, the answer to that question will be quite precise. But before providing that answer, let us …rst introduce what we shall call the Constant Consumption Pro…le Equivalent on the Reference Lifetime (CCPERL).
De…nition 1 (Constant Consumption Pro…le Equivalent on the Reference Lifetime) For any i 2 N , any R i 2 < and any x i 2 X, the Constant Consumption Pro…le Equivalent on the Reference Lifetime (CCPERL) of x i is the constant consumption pro…lex i such that (x i ) =` and
The CCPERL can be interpreted as a way to homogenize consumptions across individuals having di¤erent longevities, by converting consumptions under di¤erent 7 Such an incompatibility between the Pareto principle and the principle of transfer in the multidimensional context is well documented. See, for instance, Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2011) . Intuitively, the problem stems from the fact that, at a low common level of longevity, making a progressive transfer from an individual who cares a lot about longevity to another who cares less about longevity may be Pareto equivalent to a regressive transfer at a larger level of longevitytheir indi¤erence curves crossing at an intermediate level of longevity.
8 It is indeed likely that societies with a better health will consider that` is larger.
longevities into some comparable consumptions. The intuition behind that homogenization exercise is the following. In the present context, where agents have unequal longevities, looking at individual consumption pro…les does not su¢ ce to have a precise idea of individual well-being. However, the CCPERL does allow to have a more precise view, as it has, by construction, taken longevity di¤erentials into account. It is trivial to see that, if x i is a constant consumption pro…le with (x i ) =` , thenx i = x i . However, if x i is a constant consumption pro…le (with consumption level for each life-period equal to c i ) with`<` , then we havex i ? (c i ; :::; c i ), depending on whether c i lies above or below the critical level making a longer life with that consumption worth being lived. The CCPERL of x i always exists if` = T; by assumption made on <; but the existence of the CCPERL is not guaranteed if < T: It may happen that x i with high longevity is strictly preferred to all lifetime consumption pro…les with lower longevity` : When this happens, we adopt the convention that the CCPERL is in…nite. This problem of non-existence is not very important as the social preferences highlighted here focus on the worst-o¤ individuals.
Having de…ned the CCPERL, we can now present the following theorem, which characterizes the social preferences, or, more precisely, states that the Maximin on CCPERL is a necessary condition for social optimality.
Theorem 1 Assume that the social ordering function % satis…es Axioms 1-2-3-4 on
In other words, the social ordering satis…es the Maximin property on the Constant Consumption Pro…le Equivalent on the Reference Lifetime (CCPERL).
The proof is in the Appendix. It should be noted that this theorem does not give a full characterization of social preferences because it does not say how to compare allocations for which min (x i ) = min (ŷ i ).
9 All the theorem states is that if one allocation exhibits a higher minimum CCPERL than another, then it must also be socially more desirable. In other words, the theorem implies that maximizing min (x i ) is a necessary operation, as the best social allocation is necessarily included in the set of allocations that maximize min (x i ).
Theorem 1, although being a partial characterization result, tells us a lot about social preferences. True, if the set of allocations that maximize min (x i ) is not a singleton, looking at the minimum CCPERL only would not tell us which allocation is the most desirable. However, in more concrete problems, it is likely that the Maximin on CCPERL has, as a solution, a unique allocation, in which case that allocation must also be the most socially desirable allocation. When a unique solution is not obtained, it is natural to re…ne the Maximin into the Leximin, which extends the lexicographic priority of the worse-o¤ to higher ranks in the distribution.
While the details of the proof are provided in the Appendix, its overall form can be brie ‡y given here. The proof proceeds in two stages. In a …rst stage, it is shown that Weak Pareto, Hansson Independence and Pigou-Dalton for Equal Preferences and Equal Lifetimes imply Hammond Equity for Equal Preferences. That principle states that, if two persons i and j have the same preferences, but i lies on a higher indi¤erence curve than j, pushing i on a lower indi¤erence curve and j on a higher one is socially desirable. This embodies an absolute priority for the worst-o¤. In a second stage, Hammond Equity for Equal Preferences is then used to show that, if we add Pigou-Dalton for Constant Consumption and Reference Lifetime, we obtain Hammond Equity for Reference Lifetime. According to that principle, if two persons i and j, possibly with di¤erent preferences, have the same longevity equal to the reference` , but i has a higher constant consumption pro…le than j, then lowering the constant consumption pro…le of i and raising the one of j is socially desirable.
Let us note that an alternative characterization can be made in a slightly di¤erent setting. Suppose for the rest of this section that longevity is a continuous variable, so that a lifetime consumption pro…le is now described as a function x i (t) de…ned over the interval [0; T ] : We restrict attention to functions x i (t) which are strictly positive and continuous over an interval [0; (x i )] and null over the complement ( (x i ) ; T ] : The corresponding longevity is obviously (x i ). Individual preferences over lifetime consumption pro…les x i can still be de…ned and assumed to be convex, continuous (with respect to the topology of pointwise convergence) and weakly monotonic. The axioms of Weak Pareto and Hansson Independence are immediately adapted to this setting. Let us now introduce a new axiom which states that, whatever the individual preferences, it is always socially desirable to reduce longevity inequalities among agents who enjoy the same consumption per life-period, when one agent lives longer than` and the other has a shorter life. For this axiom not to be idle, it must be assumed that 0 <` < T: A similar assumption was not needed with the axiom of Pigou-Dalton for Constant Consumption and Reference Lifetime.
Axiom 5 (Inequality Reduction around Reference Lifetime) For all R N 2 < jN j , all x N , y N 2 X jN j , and all i, j 2 N , such that (x i ) =`i, (y i ) =`0 i , (x j ) =`j and (y j ) =`0 j , and some c 2 R ++ is the same constant per-period level of consumption for x i ; y i ; x j ; y j ; if j ;`0 j ` `i;`0 i and`j `0 j =`0 i `i > 0 and x k = y k for all k 6 = i; j, then
That axiom is quite attractive: reducing longevity inequalities between longlived and short-lived agents who enjoy equal consumptions per period can hardly be regarded as undesirable. Note, however, that the attractiveness of that axiom is not independent from the monotonicity of preferences in longevity. If consumption per period is so low that some agents may prefer having a short rather than a long life, reducing longevity inequalities by raising the longevity of the short-lived may be socially undesirable. Thus this axiom, unlike axioms 3 and 4, must be used in a subdomain of preferences satisfying a stronger monotonicity condition with respect to longevity.
Observe that by weak monotonicity, for every individual preference ordering R i and every lifetime consumption pro…le x i ; there is a unique constant pro…le with same longevity such that every pro…le with greater consumption and same longevity is strictly preferred and every pro…le with lower consumption and same longevity is strictly worse. Therefore, by Weak Pareto one can restrict attention to constant lifetime consumption pro…les and work with bundles having two dimensions, namely, per-period consumption and longevity. Formally, Inequality Reduction around Reference Lifetime is then similar to the Free Lunch Aversion Condition proposed by Maniquet and Sprumont (2004) in the context of public goods provision. It is then a simple adaptation of their analysis to show that the conclusion of Theorem 1 holds in this particular setting when it is required that the social ordering function must obey the axioms 1-2-5. The only minor di¤erence is that longevity is here bounded between 0 and T; whereas the corresponding variable (contribution of private good to the production of public good) is unbounded in their model. 10 10 Although Inequality Reduction around Reference Lifetime is meaningful in the model of this paper introduced in Section 2, Th. 1 does not hold with axioms 1-2-5, even with stronger monotonicity assumptions about individual preferences. The reason is that if the worst-o¤ gains very little, this may not be equivalent to gaining one period of longevity at any level of consumption. Axiom 5 is then powerless because it applies only when the worst-o¤ in the "transfer" of longevity gains at least one period of additional longevity.
The social optimum
The previous section showed that basic axioms on social preferences imply that the optimal allocation must maximize the minimum CCPERL in the population. What are the consequences of this result on the optimum allocation of resources? If, for instance, a social planner could have anticipated, in 1900, the distribution of longevities of Swedish women as shown on Figure 1 , how should he have allocated a …xed amount of resources among the cohort members?
This section aims at characterizing the social optimum in a resource allocation problem when the axioms of Theorem 1 are satis…ed. We will also examine, in the light of the optimum allocation of resources, to what extent the Maximin on CCPERL leads to a partial or a total compensation of short-lived agents.
Environment
Let us consider a simple model where agents live either one or two periods (i.e. T = 2).
11 The …rst period can be interpreted as the young age of life, which is lived by everyone. The second period, i.e. the old age of life, is enjoyed by some individuals only. The length of life of each agent is only known ex post. Ex ante, the social planner knows individual preferences and life expectancies, as well as the statistical distribution of longevity in the population, and looks for the optimum allocation of an endowment W of resources.
Individual lifetime welfare takes a standard time-additive form:
where c ij and d ij denote …rst-period and second-period consumptions of an agent with a time preference factor i and a survival probability j , while U 1 ij and U 2 ij denote his actual lifetime utility if he lives respectively one or two periods, and EU ij is the corresponding expected utility. Temporal utility u( ) takes the same form for everyone. 12 11 The assumption T = 2 is here made for analytical simplicity (i.e. it reduces the number of groups ex post). We discuss below how robust our results are to assuming T > 2.
12 Note that the assumptions made on preferences in Section 2 impose some restrictions on the form of u( ), for instance regarding the possibility for u( ) to be bounded from above. However, we consider, for this analytical application, the more general case where u( ) is not subject to those restrictions, and only satis…es the standard properties u 0 ( ) > 0 and u 00 ( ) < 0.
Heterogeneity here takes the following form. Ex ante, agents di¤er in their attitude towards the future, i.e. in their time preferences, i , and in their survival probabilities, j , with two types for each parameter:
Hence, there exist 4 types of agents ex ante, who are di¤erentiated by their i and j . Ex post, there are 8 types of agents, as each ex ante type includes short-lived and long-lived agents.
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For the sake of presentation, we here adopt three assumptions which will be relaxed later on (see Section 5). First, we assume, to simplify the identi…cation of worst-o¤ agents, that u(0) > 0, so that it is always strictly better to be long-lived rather than short-lived. Second, we assume that the social planner faces a unique intertemporal resource constraint, in the sense that he can allocate resources as …rst-period or second-period consumptions without any cost. Third, we assume that agents cannot transfer resources across periods, so that the bundles (received from the planner) have to be consumed in the same periods as they are received, without any possibility, at the individual level, to reallocate resources over time (this amounts to assuming a full taxation of individual savings).
Within that framework, the problem of the social planner consists in o¤ering four consumption bundles (c ij ; d ij ) to agents with time preference parameter i and survival probability j , for i = 1; 2 and j = 1; 2. Note that these bundles do not depend on whether agents live one or two periods, as the actual length of life is not known ex ante by the planner. In the following, we …rst solve the problem faced by a social planner under the Maximin on CCPERL, assuming that the planner can observe characteristics i and j . We relax this assumption in subsection 4.3.
First-best optimum
The problem of the social planner amounts to selecting bundles (c ij ; d ij ) in such a way as to maximize the minimum CCPERL, subject to the resource constraint of the economy. As stated above, the de…nition of the CCPERL requires the selection of a reference longevity level` . For that purpose, we will take the maximum length`= 2 as a reference level` . By de…nition, the CCPERL for an agent of type ( i ; j ) with an actual length of life`= 1; 2 is the constant consumption pro…lex ij`= (ĉ ij`;ĉij`) 13 For simplicity, we assume that there is a mass 1 of individuals in each of the ex ante groups.
such that:
On the …rst line,ĉ ij2 de…nes the consumption equivalent of an agent with time preference i and survival probability j who e¤ectively lived two periods, while the second line de…nes a consumption equivalentĉ ij1 for a ( i ; j )-type agent living only one period. Note that since we take ex-post utilities on the right-hand side of these expressions, the CCPERL of an agent does not depend on his survival probability.
14 Following those equalities, one can de…ne the consumption equivalentx ij`= (ĉ ij`;ĉij`) for each of the 8 groups of individuals that emerge ex post. where the CCPERLĉ ij`a re de…ned in Table 1 .
To solve that problem, we …rst need to identify the worst-o¤ agents. We can …rst note that, as u(0) > 0, short-lived agents are worse-o¤ than long-lived agents of the same type, as death prevented them from enjoying the second period (which is positively valued). From this, it follows that the allocation that satis…es the Maximin on CCPERL is obtained by transferring second-period resources to the …rst period, i.e. by decreasing d ij to 0:
14 Thus we would obtain the same CCPERL if agents did not di¤er in survival chances.
Second, the CCPERL can be equalized among short-lived agents by increasing c 2j and decreasing c 1j until one reachesĉ 111 =ĉ 121 =ĉ 211 =ĉ 221 . This is obtained by setting c 11 = c 12 < c 21 = c 22 . Hence, …rst-period consumption is larger for patient agents (i.e. with a high i ) as they are more a¤ected by a short life than impatient agents (i.e. with a low i ). Thus, to compensate them, more consumption in the …rst period is needed. This justi…es the di¤erentiated treatment in terms of consumption between agents with di¤erent time preferences. We obtain the following ranking: 15 c 111 =ĉ 121 =ĉ 211 =ĉ 221 <ĉ 112 =ĉ 122 <ĉ 212 =ĉ 222 under our assumption u (0) > 0. Thus, whereas the Maximin on CCPERL enables us to make some compensation of short-lived individuals, this does not, however, imply a full compensation, because the social planner cannot, ex ante, know the actual lengths of life. Moreover, as the above ranking shows, among the long-lived agents, there is also an inequality due to the larger bene…t of living longer for patient agents.
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Note that the social planner does not use the information on survival probabilities j to o¤er distinct consumption bundles to agents with di¤erent life expectancies. As mentioned earlier, this uniform treatment of agents with di¤erent j comes from the fact that survival probabilities do not in ‡uence the CCPERL, which is de…ned ex post, that is, once the risk of death has been resolved. 17 What we do here is to compensate short-lived agents, independently of how unlucky their death was. The following proposition sums up the results obtained in the …rst-best problem.
Proposition 1 Assume that u(0) > 0, and that the social planner faces a unique intertemporal budget constraint. Under perfect information about ex-ante types ( i ; j ):
Maximin CCPERL involves higher …rst-period consumptions for patient agents, and lower …rst-period consumptions for impatient agents. Second-period consumptions are all set to zero.
15 Note that the equality between the CCPERL of short-lived agents may not necessarily hold when temporal utility u( ) is bounded upwards. Here we assume that the equality of CCPERL for all short-lived agents is feasible. 16 Indeed one has, at the solution of the Maximin on CCPERL that,
with c 11 < c 21 and 1 < 2 . The same reasoning applies for u (ĉ 122 ) < u (ĉ 222 ). 17 Note that this result is robust to the sign of u(0), which does not need to be positive.
Agents who di¤er in their survival probabilities but have the same preferences are treated identically. The introduction of heterogeneity in survival probabilities does not alter the optimal allocation.
Maximin CCPERL implies a partial compensation of short-lived agents with respect to long-lived agents.
Second-best optimum
Up to now, we assumed that individual characteristics i and j were perfectly observable by the social planner. This subsection reexamines the egalitarian-equivalent solution under asymmetric information, that is, when agents know their ( i ; j )-type, while the government only observes the distributions of types. The government can still propose di¤erent bundles to ex ante groups, but under the constraint of incentive compatibility.
As in the …rst-best, we take the maximum length`= 2 as the reference level for de…ning the CCPERL. Let us …rst recall that in the …rst-best, …rst-period consumptions are distributed among agents only according to their time preferences, and second-period consumptions are set to zero. Hence, under asymmetric information, independently of their survival chance j , only type-1 agents would like to mimic type-2 agents, so that the second-best allocation now has to also satisfy the following incentive compatibility constraint,
The …rst-best egalitarian-equivalent optimum, with c 11 = c 12 < c 21 = c 22 and d ij = 0 for all i; j; is not incentive-compatible, because it violates the above condition. As the Maximin on CCPERL focuses on short-lived agents, it still makes sense to keep d ij = 0, but we now need, in order to satisfy the incentive constraint, to equalize …rst-period consumptions. In sum, the second-best Maximin CCPERL solution is:
As a consequence, we havê In comparison with the …rst-best, it is no longer possible to equalize the consumptionequivalent of short-lived agents, as this would require consumption inequalities that violate the incentive-compatibility constraint. Moreover, the best-o¤ are now the long-lived impatient agents, because they give less weight to the low utility of the second period. The following proposition sums up the results of the second-best.
Proposition 2 Assume that u(0) > 0, and that the social planner faces a unique intertemporal budget constraint. Under asymmetric information about ex ante types
Maximin CCPERL involves an equalization of …rst-period consumptions for all agents. Second-period consumptions are all equal to zero.
A common feature of the …rst-best and the second-best optima is that consumptions are, in each case, not smoothed across time. Indeed, the compensation of short-lived agents requires resources to be concentrated at the young age (since this is enjoyed by all individuals, either short-lived or long-lived). Another common point is that, because of u(0) > 0, and because of the impossibility to identify shortlived persons ex ante, the Maximin CCPERL cannot provide a full compensation of short-lived persons. However, the second-best optimum di¤ers from the …rst-best by the equal treatment of all agents in the …rst period of life, whatever their time preferences are. Note also that, in the second-best, the distortion must be only on the …rst-period consumption, as changing second-period consumptions would raise inequalities between short-lived and long-lived agents.
Extensions and generalisations
As shown in Section 4, the Maximin on CCPERL yields rather extreme solutions. The optimal allocation consists of a corner solution, as it involves zero consumption at the old age. Moreover, the allocation of resources recommended by the Maximin on CCPERL does not allow to provide a full compensation of short-lived persons. Whatever we consider the …rst-best or the second-best context, long-lived agents are always better o¤ than short-lived agents ceteris paribus.
In this section, we propose to check whether the assumptions we made in Section 4 are responsible for those results. For this purpose, we will relax di¤erent assumptions successively, and discuss the robustness of the solution to those changes. Firstly, we will consider more general preferences, by relaxing the assumption of a positive utility of survival (i.e. u(0) > 0). Secondly, we will relax the assumption of two life-periods, and study the optimum under T > 2. Thirdly, we examine the case where there exists a continuum of types in terms of time preferences and life expectancies. Fourthly, we discuss the possibility of adopting a reference lifetime` lower than maximum longevity. Finally, while we assumed so far that the social planner controlled the allocation of resources over time, we will consider the case where agents can freely transfer resources across periods (i.e. no full taxation of savings).
The utility of survival
In the previous section, the social optimum was de…ned under the assumption u(0) > 0, that is, the temporal utility function has a strictly positive intercept. That assumption is far from unquestionable: the assumption u(0) = 0 is quite widespread in the literature (take, for instance, a standard CES utility function u(c ij ) = c 1 ij 1 with < 1). Moreover, empirical papers focusing on di¤erential mortality assume quite often that u(0) < 0 (see, for instance, Becker et al 2005) . Therefore it makes sense to examine the robustness of our results to the intercept of the temporal utility function. As we shall now see, the assumption on u(0) is far from benign regarding the possibility or impossibility to fully compensate short-lived persons.
Let us …rst consider the case where the utility of zero consumption is zero: u (0) = 0. In this case, an individual does not gain any utility from his mere survival. Given that Table 1 is independent from the assumption on u (0), our previous reasoning still holds, so that the …rst-best optimum is such that:
The only di¤erence with respect to the case where u(0) > 0 comes from the ranking of agents in terms of CCPERL. We now have that all CCPERL are equalized across agents with di¤erent lengths of life, di¤erent survival probabilities and di¤er-ent time preferences, unlike in the case with u(0) > 0 (for which long-lived agents had higher consumption-equivalents). Thus, under the assumption u(0) = 0, the Maximin CCPERL allows for a complete compensation of short-lived agents, unlike what used to be the case when u(0) > 0.
Let us now turn to the second-best problem (asymmetric information). As the …rst-best allocation under u(0) = 0 is identical to the one under u(0) > 0, incentive constraints are also identical, so that it still optimal to provide c ij = c and d ij = 0. Again, only the ranking in terms of CCPERL changes: Proposition 3 Assume that u(0) = 0, and that the social planner faces a unique intertemporal budget constraint.
In the …rst-best, the Maximin CCPERL involves higher …rst-period consumptions for patient agents, and lower …rst-period consumptions for impatient agents. Second-period consumptions are all set to zero. This yields a full compensation of short-lived agents with respect to long-lived agents.
In the second-best, the Maximin CCPERL involves an equalization of …rst-period consumptions for all agents. Second-period consumptions are all equal to zero. This yields a full compensation of short-lived agents with respect to long-lived agents.
Let us now turn to the case in which u (0) < 0, and de…ne d as the level of consumption such that u (d ) = 0. Three cases should be distinguished in the …rst-best optimum, depending on how large the available resources W are.
If
, it is optimal to …x second-period consumptions to d , and to give a higher …rst-period consumption to patient agents. That allocation equalizes CCPERL across agents with unequal longevities, because living a second period with d or not is a matter of indi¤erence. Note that, while the positive secondperiod consumption induced by u(0) < 0 may seem to make the egalitarian-equivalent solution less "extreme" than before, it remains that this solution only assigns longlived agents a consumption that makes their survival equivalent to death. Thus, even if the Maximin CCPERL seems less extreme than in the benchmark case, the underlying idea is the same: fully compensating short-lived agents implies making the survival of long-lived agents worthless. If, alternatively, d 2 ( 1 + 2 ) < W < d [4 + 2 ( 1 + 2 )], the Maximin CCPERL gives d as second-period consumption, and a …rst-period consumption lower than d , with a higher level for patient agents. Finally, if W < d 2 ( 1 + 2 )), it is optimal to have a second-period consumption as close as possible to d , while …xing …rst-period consumption to 0.
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Consider now the asymmetric information context, and focus on the case in which
The second-best optimum does not necessarily consist in giving d to all old agents and an identical bundle c to all young agents. Suppose, for instance, that 1 is close to zero. By o¤ering a menu of two bundles, (c ; d ) and (c + "; 0), for a (not too) small ", one may induce the impatient agents to choose the latter. This frees resources and makes it possible to achieve a larger c than if the same bundle (c ; d ) was o¤ered to everyone. The worst-o¤ agents are the patient agents who choose (c ; d ), whether they die young or survive, and it is then worth maximizing c in order to maximize the lowest CCPERL. Note that in this con…guration compensation for a short life is over-achieved among impatient agents: those who die early are better o¤. Our results are summarized below.
Proposition 4 Assume that u(0) < 0 and that W > d [4 + 2 ( 1 + 2 )]. In the …rst-best, Maximin CCPERL implies a full compensation of short-lived agents with respect to long-lived agents by …xing the second-period consumption to d , and by giving a higher …rst-period consumption to patient agents. In the second-best, the optimal allocation does not necessarily consist in giving the same consumption to all young agents and d to all old agents.
The maximum lifespan
Our study of the social optimum under Maximin CCPERL was carried out within a model where agents could live either one or two periods. The reason why we focused on the case where T = 2 has to do with the simplicity of presentation. With such a basic framework, we have already 8 distinct groups of agents ex post. Raising the maximum lifespan to T > 2 would, under a realistic demography (i.e. with a nonzero risk of death at each period), rapidly increase the number of possible longevities and the number of groups ex post, making the presentation more lengthy.
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While the focus on the case where T = 2 is convenient, one may wonder what our results become under a more realistic demography, where the lifespan includes more periods than a "young age" and an "old age". To examine that issue, we will consider here an economy where T > 2, and where there exists a risk of death at each period. Note that if the rise in T consisted merely of adding periods of certain life at the beginning of the life-cycle, such a change would be equivalent to an extension of the …rst period in the basic model, and this would not raise the number of groups ex post, and could thus hardly a¤ect our results signi…cantly.
To study the robustness of our results to the level of T , we will distinguish between, on the one hand, the case where the intercept of the temporal utility function is strictly positive (i.e. u(0) > 0), and, on the other hand, the case where that intercept is negative or zero (i.e. u(0) 0). As we shall see, the assumption made on the intercept of the temporal utility function is, here again, crucial for the capacity of the Maximin CCPERL to compensate short-lived agents.
Under u(0) > 0, the optimum allocation of resources under the Maximin CCPERL still consists, under T > 2, to concentrate all resources at the young age of life, which is lived by everyone, and, then, to leave zero resources for the rest of the lifespan, i.e. for the ages that are not reached by everyone. As under T = 2, a di¤erentia-tion of consumptions at the young age would prevail, at the …rst-best, on the basis of time preferences (but not of life expectancies, because the CCPERL relies on ex post utilities). Moreover, at the second-best, there would be an equalization of all consumptions at the young age, and still zero resources for the older ages.
In the case where u(0) > 0, the compensation of short-lived agents provided by the Maximin CCPERL was already partial under T = 2, but it becomes even more incomplete under a higher maximum lifespan T > 2. The intuition is the following. Inequalities in longevity lead, under T > 2, to larger inequalities in lifetime welfare between short-lived and long-lived agents, in comparison with the case where T = 2. Indeed, under the postulated time-additive lifetime welfare, the utility from mere survival, which is positive, accumulates itself over a larger number of time-periods for survivors, leading thus to larger welfare inequalities between the long-lived and the short-lived. Hence, under u(0) > 0, the Maximin CCPERL would only provide a more partial compensation under T > 2 than under T = 2.
However, if we make the more plausible assumption u(0) 0, then the extension to T > 2 periods would not prevent a complete compensation to short-lived agents. In that case, and provided the available resources are su¢ ciently large, the consumption at all ages beyond the …rst deaths would be equal to subsistence consumption d , yielding, by de…nition, no welfare gain from surviving one or many extra life-periods (as u(d ) = 0). The remaining resources would then be concentrated on the young ages (i.e. lived by everyone). As a consequence, the full compensation of short-lived agents would still prevail in that case, contrary to what happens under u(0) > 0.
In the light of this, it appears that a rise in the maximum lifespan T does not, under u(0) 0, a¤ect the capacity of the Maximin CCPERL to compensate short-lived agents. Note, however, that a higher T pushes a larger pressure on the existing …xed endowment of resources W . Clearly, providing a consumption d for all survivors, at all ages exceeding the …rst deaths, requires more resources under a large T than under a low T . Hence, when we assume, as above, that the available resources are "su¢ ciently large", this is a stronger assumption under T > 2 than under T = 2. Put it di¤erently, a rise in the maximum lifespan raises, for a given endowment of re-sources, the likelihood of the case where the long-lived are the worst-o¤s individuals. If so, then the issue of compensating the short-lived is no longer at stake.
In sum, the extent to which a rise in the maximum lifespan T a¤ects the compensation of short-lived agents depends crucially on the level of the intercept of the temporal utility function. The proposition below summarizes our results.
Proposition 5 Consider a rise in the maximum lifespan, i.e. T > 2.
Under u(0) > 0, the Maximin CCPERL leads to a lower compensation of the short-lived with respect to the long-lived, in comparison with the case where T = 2 (both at the …rst-best and second-best).
Under u(0) 0, and provided the available resources are su¢ ciently large, the Maximin CCPERL still leads, under T > 2, to a complete compensation of short-lived agents with respect to the long-lived.
A continuum of types
The previous analyses have assumed a …nite discrete number of types of agents ex ante. Let us now consider what the optimum allocation of resources would become under a continuum of types of ex ante agents. For that purpose, we will turn back to the two-period model, and assume a distribution of time preference parameters 2 ; and of survival probabilities 2 [ ; ].
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In order to study the social optimum in that alternative framework, we will rely here extensively on graphical analyses, and concentrate only on the second-best optimum. In that case, incentive constraints impose to give all agents (who cannot be distinguished ex ante by the planner) the same budget set, represented by the decreasing line in Figure 3 below. The optimistic ( ) patient ( ) agents choose the bundle (c; d), that is, from all chosen bundles, the farthest on the left, while the pessimistic impatient ( ; ) agents choose the bundle that is the most on the right.
Let us …rst focus on the case in which u(0) = 0, which is illustrated in Figure 3 . The CCPERL index, with` = 2, is computed as the solution to
if the agent lives one period.
We then compare the welfare of the agents who consume (c; d) and those who consume c and die. It is clear from above that, for given preferences, the latter are Let us now consider the case in which u(0) > 0. Again, for given preferences, the worst-o¤ agents are those who die young (because u(d) > 0). To visualize their situation, it is convenient to extend u ( ) to negative values, and to …nd d < 0 such that u(d ) = 0: For short-lived agents, one then computes the CCPERL by solving:
Looking at Figure 4 , this corresponds to …nding the point (c; d ) and drawing the indi¤erence curve that goes through that point. The intersection with the 45 line gives the agent's CCPERL. Again, ex post, the worst-o¤ are the ; type who die young, as again their CCPERL are the closest to the left. From this graphical analysis, it is easy to recover the analytical results of the previous section about the second-best policy. Moreover, one can also obtain a simple way to evaluate arbitrary policies, by observing that the CCPERL of the short-lived ; -type depends only on the …rst-period consumption of this type, which is the lowest by incentive compatibility.
Proposition 6 If u(0) 0; the comparison of two budget sets is made as follows: the better budget set is the one that induces the larger level of lowest …rst-period consumption.
Let us …nally illustrate the case in which u(0) < 0. We now de…ne d > 0 such that u(d ) = 0. We …rst consider the "normal" case in which all agents choose a point (c; d) such that c d and thus u (c) > 0. If d > d , then, for given preferences, the worst-o¤s are still those who die young, because u(d) > 0. Figure 5 illustrates that case. If, on the contrary, one had d < d , the worst-o¤ agents would be the long-lived agents. When some agents choose (c; d) such that c < d , the worst-o¤ are not necessarily agents with characteristics ; ; depending of the precise con…guration, but certainly the worst-o¤ agents are among those who choose in this way. Indeed, their CCPERL index is then less than d (whatever the reference longevity), whereas those who choose (c; d) such that c d have a CCPERL index at least as large as d :
Reference longevity
Let us now examine the sensitivity of the Maximin CCPERL solution to the longevity level chosen as a reference. As shown in Section 3, the CCPERL is constructed for a particular reference longevity level, at which comparisons in terms of dominance of consumption bundles can be made independently of the agents'preferences over longevity. Given that there are several candidates for the reference longevity level, it makes sense to study the robustness of our solution to this reference.
Until now, we have assumed that the reference longevity was the maximum length of life, i.e.` = 2, and computed the CCPERL for all individuals on the basis of that reference longevity. Let us now assume, alternatively, that the reference longevity` is the minimum longevity (i.e. 1 period). Under this assumption, Table 1 becomes: For simplicity, we will assume here that u (0) > 0. In order to …nd the bundles maximizing the minimum CCPERL, we …rst need to identify the worst-o¤ individuals. Here again it is clear that the long-lived individuals are better-o¤ than the short-lived individuals. Therefore the optimal allocation must have
It is also obvious that equalizing the CCPERL of short-lived individuals is achieved by equalizing their consumption. One must therefore have
Note that this equalization of all …rst-period consumptions di¤ers from what prevailed under` = 2, where patient agents received a higher …rst-period consumption than impatient agents. The reason is that, when the reference longevity is the minimum longevity (i.e. under` = 1), the CCPERL of the short-lived becomes independent from time preferences, contrary to what was the case when the reference longevity was assumed to be the maximum longevity. Actually, when the reference longevity is one period, all short-lived agents become equal, whether they are patient or not, and this explains why they all have the same compensation.
Note that our …rst-best optimum is also incentive compatible, and, therefore, optimal in the second-best context. Proposition 7 Assume that u(0) > 0, and that the social planner faces a unique intertemporal budget constraint. In the …rst-best, the Maximin CCPERL under` = 1 equalizes all …rst-period consumptions, and sets all second-period consumptions to zero. In the second-best, the Maximin CCPERL under` = 1 coincides with the …rst-best allocation and is exactly the same as under` = 2.
In sum, this subsection reveals that the choice of a particular reference longevity level has some e¤ects on the …rst-best egalitarian-equivalent solution, but is less crucial in the second-best context. All in all, one should not exaggerate the in ‡uence of the reference longevity on the Maximin CCPERL solution. Whatever` , it keeps the property of decreasing optimal consumption pro…les, in such a way as to compensate short-lived agents.
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Savings
Up to now, we have assumed that agents could not save resources from one period to the other, or, equivalently, that their savings were controlled by the social planner. In this section, we relax that assumption and assume that savings are completely free. For simplicity, we keep the assumption u (0) > 0.
Now the social planner must, at the beginning of the …rst period, give an endowment to individuals, which they can freely allocate between their two periods of life. We denote by W ij the amount of resources the social planner gives to individuals with time preference factor i and survival probability j .
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Hence, when the planner provides W ij to agents, they …rst decide how to allocate it between …rst-period and second-period consumptions, by solving the problem:
so that the indirect utility function of a ( i ; j )-type agent is
where c ij (W ij ) ; d ij (W ij ) are obtained from solving the agent's problem. It is clear from this maximization problem that, if W ij = W for all i; j, we would have d 11 < d 12 ; d 21 < d 22 , as impatient agents with a lower survival probability prefer to consume more in the beginning of their life. In this alternative setting, we rede…ne the consumption equivalentĉ ij`f or each of the 8 groups of agents: There are two main di¤erences with respect to the standard case (Section 4.2). First, the planner now di¤erentiates bundles also with respect to survival probabilities, contrary to the case where agents could not save. The planner now takes into account that, when agents can transfer resources to the second period, their actual consumption in the …rst period depends both on their time preferences and on their survival chances. Hence, agents who die early are more penalized by death when they had better survival prospects because they saved more. Second, inequalities in CCPERL between short-lived and long-lived agents are larger than in the standard case. This is due to the fact that, since W ij is given to agents before they know their length of life, agents always save some resources for the second period (thus d ij > 0 for survivors). The compensation made by the planner is then limited by the possibility of individual savings. For the same reason, it is no longer possible to equalize the CCPERLs of long-lived agents with equal preferences.
Finally, we solve the problem under asymmetric information. If the planner were to propose the …rst-best bundles, individuals would always have interest in claiming to be a ( 2 ; 2 )-type agent. Hence, in order to solve the incentive problem, the optimum requires that the allocation is such that
All possibilities of compensatory redistribution are gone in this context. This generates the following ranking among short-lived agents (assuming 1 2 < 2 1 ): Proposition 8 Assume that u(0) > 0, and that both the social planner and agents face a unique intertemporal budget constraint. In the …rst-best, the Maximin CCPERL di¤erentiates individual endowments W ij according to time preferences and survival probabilities. In the second-best, the Maximin CCPERL gives the same bundle to all.
Assuming that agents can save at the same rate as the government nulli…es the possibilities of compensation between long-lived and short-lived agents. This should be viewed as an extreme case, as the opposite extreme from the assumption that the agents cannot save at all. In the intermediate case in which the planner can tax savings and redistribute the proceeds, without being able (for technical or political reasons) to impose a prohibitive tax, the optimal policy under CCPERL would adopt the largest admissible tax in order to maximize …rst-period consumptions.
Concluding remarks
Can one compensate the dead? Such a compensation seems impossible: short-lived persons are hard to identify ex ante, and, once dead, it is too late. However, this study provides a positive answer: one solution is to allocate resources ex ante in such a way as to maximize the minimum Constant Consumption Pro…le Equivalent on the Reference Lifetime. The Maximin CCPERL solution involves, in general, declining consumption pro…les, and provides a full compensation to the short-lived when the utility from mere survival is non-positive.
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Is the Maximin CCPERL solution applicable, and by means of which instruments? Regarding pensions, our egalitarian-equivalent approach would recommend, under a Pay-As-You-Go pension system, to reduce contributions from the young, and to reduce pensions of the elderly to low levels. There would also be little encouragement for savings, since savings always make the short-lived worse o¤. Regarding the age of retirement, our approach would recommend a lifecycle that di¤ers from the common one. Instead of leaving the enjoyment of retirement to ages not reached by the worst-o¤s, our approach would recommend an early "break" period which could be enjoyed by all. Recent protests against raising retirement age in France did prominently mention the unfair situation of categories of workers who die earlier than others.
Comparing the Maximin CCPERL solution with the actual consumption pro…les, which exhibit an inverted-U shape (see Lee and Tuljapurkar, 1997) , su¢ ces to show how real economies depart from our egalitarian-equivalent approach to social justice. Clearly, the …rst, increasing part of the actual age-consumption pro…le is hardly compatible with our results. While popular wisdom usually encourages youngsters to enjoy life when they can, it also carries an "ideal" of a long and constantly happy life. The ideas of discouraging savings and of favoring early gifts over bequests (that may come too late) are not common. Our analysis, however, reveals the hidden unfairness in the prevailing ideal of a long and happy life. While it is rational for every individual to pursue this ideal, letting all organize their life around it is the source of deep inequalities due to di¤erential longevity, and ultimately runs against the ex post, true interests of the unlucky who die young. Policy-makers generally worry about myopic behaviors and seek ways to encourage or force people to save for their old age. Myopia, after all, might be the best ally of fairness for the short-lived.
Applying the Maximin CCPERL would thus lead to a radical change of perspective and a vast reorganization of the lifecycle. However, such changes may not be implementable in a political democracy, for several reasons. First, our egalitarianequivalent approach would be bene…cial, ex post, to the short-lived, but these are, by de…nition, unable to vote, ex post, in favor of this approach. In particular, young people may not adhere to the approach because death is a taboo. Even if death is the only certain event of a life, it remains a thing that people prefer to forget. Third, our societies are ageing societies, and thus older voters may prefer to improve their lot, even if this reinforces arbitrary inequalities caused by Nature.
Two important issues have been left for future research. Some longevity inequalities result from individual behaviours, not simply from natural factors. One might think that, intuitively, risk-taking short-lived agents should be less compensated than other short-lived persons, as the former are more responsible for their short life than the latter. Incorporating this element of responsibility in the analysis of compensation for a short life requires a substantial extension of the setting and a reexamination of the social objective.
We have also ignored the possibility that the agents derive utility from leaving a bequest. If an agent who dies young leaves a larger bequest than an otherwise similar agent who lives longer, the presence of bequest utility achieves a partial compensation for dying young. If, on the contrary, living longer makes it possible to accumulate more and leave a larger legacy, then this reinforces the inequalities due to di¤erential longevity. A serious study of this issue requires a richer model with production, and also a re…nement of the Maximin CCPERL criterion.
8 Appendix: Proof of Theorem 1 Lemma 1 Assume that the social ordering function % satis…es Axioms 1-2-3 on < jN j . Then % is such that for all R N 2 < jN j , all x N , y N 2 X jN j , and all i, j 2 N , if R i = R j and y i P i x i P i x j P j y j and x k P k y k for all k 6 = i; j, then
Proof. If (x i ) = (y i ) = (x j ) = (y j ) ; the result follows from Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2011, Lemma A.1) . By assumption on <, there exist x N ; y N such that: 1) ( x i ) = ( y i ) = ( x j ) = ( y j ) = T ; 2) y i P Lemma 2 Assume that the social ordering function % satis…es Axioms 1-2-3-4 on < jN j . Then % is such that for all R N 2 < jN j , all x N , y N 2 X jN j , and all i, j 2 N , if y i >x i >x j >ŷ j and x k P k y k for all k 6 = i; j, then
Proof. The allocations constructed in this proof all involve a longevity equal to` and a constant consumption for i; j (this will not be repeated below). Let R denote the Leontief preferences represented by min fx ik j x ik > 0; 1 k T g : Let z The rest of the proof of Th. 1 is a standard argument (see Hammond 1979 or Fleurbaey and Maniquet 2011) .
